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Unified Growth Theory: An Insight 
Faustine Perrin  
Abstract: »Ein Einblick in die Unified Growth Theory«. The Unified Growth 
Theory is receiving increasing attention from growth theorists since the semin-
al work of Galor and Weil (1999, 2000). These authors emphasize the need for 
a unified theory of growth that could account for the transition from Malthu-
sian Stagnation to the Modern Growth Regime (1999). This interest is moti-
vated by the lack of explanation and knowledge regarding the historical evolu-
tion of the relationship among population growth, technological change and the 
standard of living. This paper gives an overview of the Unified Growth 
Theory, its determinants and its implications. 
Keywords: economic growth, Malthusian stagnation, great divergence, demo-
graphic transition. 
1. Introduction 
Human history can be clearly divided into two distinct eras, separated by a 
transitional period1. Before the Industrial Revolution all societies were charac-
terized by a very long period of stagnation in per capita income with high fertil-
ity rates and the dominance of physical over human capital (Clark, 2005). Since 
this fateful period, Western countries observed a complete reversal with a high 
sustained income per capita, low fertility and human capital as an important 
source of income. The trends upheaval strongly suggests the existence of an 
interaction between the decline in fertility, the rise of human capital and the 
onset of sustained growth. 
Figure 1 illustrates the variation in timing of the transition to a state of sus-
tained economic growth across different regions of the world and that lead to a 
spectacular rise in the GDP per capita. 
For a long time, theories which aim to explain the development and eco-
nomic growth found their inspiration in Malthusian and Neoclassical concep-
tions. In his essay on the principle of population (1798), Malthus defends a 
“pessimistic” vision of the impact of population on the long run economic 
development (coherent with the world economic history prior to the Industrial 
Revolution). In opposition to Malthus’ approach, the Solow model considers 
demographic behaviors independent from wages, incomes or prices. Thereafter, 
growth theorists exploring mechanisms by which fertility and growth are re-
                                                             
  Address all communications to: Faustine Perrin, Université de Strasbourg, 61 avenue de la 
Forêt, Noire 67085 Strasbourg, Cedex, France; e-mail: faustine.perrin@etu.unistra.fr. 
1  See Annexe for a better understanding of the full time span of human economic history. 
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lated focused for the most part on the modern era (Barro and Becker, 1989; 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995; Becker et al., 1990; Moav, 2005; Tamura, 1994, 
1996). The so-called endogenous growth theory, taking into account family 
behavior, was able to explain empirical regularities that characterized the 
growth process of developed countries over the last hundred years.  
Figure 1: Evolution of Regional GDP per Capita, 1-2001 
 
Source: Galor2 (2004). 
 
Nevertheless, both exogenous and endogenous models remain inconsistent with 
the pattern of development over the very long run. They fail either to capture 
the recent negative relationship between population growth and income per 
capita or to comprehend the positive effect of income per capita on population 
growth and the economic factors that triggered the demographic transition. 
This left the door open for a new generation of growth theorists (Galor and 
Weil, 2000; Galor and Moav, 2002; Hansen and Prescott, 2002; Strulik and 
Weisdorf, 2008) to face the challenge of developing a theory consistent with 
the entire process of development. Advanced first by Galor and Weil (1999, 
2000), the Unified Growth Theory intends to capture in a single framework the 
main characteristics of the transition from the Malthusian era to the modern 
era, as well as the associated phenomenon of Great Divergence and Demo-
graphic Transition. The theory suggests that: 
                                                             
2  Using Maddison data (2003) – Western Offshoots consists of United-States, Canada, Aus-
tralia and New-Zealand. 
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[…] the transition from stagnation to growth is an inevitable by-product of the 
inherent Malthusian interaction between population and technology, and its 
ultimate impact on the demand for human capital and thereby on the onset of 
the demographic transition. Oded Galor (2004) 
2. Historical Evidence: The Process of Development 
Several important features stand out from the data (Maddison, 2001; Clark) for 
selected countries and regions of the world. Human history can be clearly di-
vided in two distinct eras: the pre-industrial phase for all countries before 1800 
and a period of sustained economic growth for Western countries. This evi-
dence is supported by Figure 2 taken from Clark (2007). It represents the real 
income per capita in England from 1200 to the present. Prior to the Industrial 
Revolution real income evolved horizontally around a subsistence level and 
increased exponentially after the 1860-70s.  
Figure 2: Real Income per Person, 1200-2004 
 
Source: From Clark (2007). 
Stagnation: The Malthusian Era 
Stagnation characterized human history for thousands of years. At this stage, 
population growth was positively affected by the level of income per capita. 
From this period marked by the absence of significant changes in the level of 
technology it resulted in a proportional increase in output and population. In-
come per capita was trapped around a subsistence level and population size 
remained relatively stable. 
As depicted by Maddison’s data (2001), the average level of world per capi-





$670 per year then until the end of the 18th century (Figure 3). The monotonic 
increase in income per capita during the Malthusian era was associated with 
such a uniform evolution of the average population growth rate in the world 
(0.01% per year in the first millennium; 0.1% per year in the years 1000-1500; 
0.27% per year over the period 1500-1820) while it did not result in variations 
in the standard of living. 
Take-off: The Post-Malthusian Regime 
In the beginning of the 19th century, Western countries experienced a take-off 
from Malthusian stagnation. This shift took place with the increase in the pace 
of technological progress in association with the process of industrialization, 
presumably stimulated by the accumulation of human capital3. During this 
period, income and population growth are still positively correlated. It resulted 
in a significant increase in the growth rate of output per capita generating an 
unprecedented increase in population growth, (but in a minor proportion?). 
Based on Maddison’s data, the world average growth rate of output per capi-
ta increased from 0.05% per year for the period 1500-1820 to 0.54% per year 
during the period 1820-1870, and reached 1.3% per year in the years 1870-
1913. Similarly, the average rate of population growth in the world increased 
from 0.27% per year in the period 1500-1820 to 0.4% per year in the years 
1820-1870, and to 0.8% per year in the interval 1870-1913. The timing of the 
take-off differs across regions. In less developed countries4, the take-off oc-
curred progressively with a one-century delay, from the beginning of the 20th 
century. The decline in population growth marked the end of the so-called 
Post-Malthusian Regime towards the end of the 19th century in Western coun-
tries and in the second half of the century in less developed regions.  
Sustained Growth: The Modern Growth Regime 
The acceleration of technological progress in the second phase of industrializa-
tion, its interaction with the human capital accumulation and the reversal in the 
relation between income per capita and population growth signed the transition 
toward a state of sustained economic growth. The entrance in the Modern 
Growth Regime, associated with the phenomenon of demographic transition, 
has led to a great divergence in income per capita in the past two centuries in 
Western countries (Galor, 2011). 
The phenomenon of demographic transition occurred in the course of the 
last century as countries developed along the industrialization. This process 
accounts for the transition from high birth and death rates to low birth and 
                                                             
3  The demand for education increased toward the end of the period. 
4  By developed countries, we mean Latin America, Asia and Africa. 
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death rates. In pre-industrial society, both death and birth rates fluctuated 
around a high level (depending on food supply, diseases, natural events…). 
During the 19th century in Western countries, mortality rates dropped rapidly 
while birth rates remained high, involving an increase in population. In the 
following stage, birth rates fell and population growth began to level off.  
According to Maddison’s data, a reversal in the rate of population growth 
occurred by the end of the 19th century-beginning of the 20th century for par-
ticular regions of the world (Western Europe, Western Offshoots and Eastern 
Europe). From an average of 0.77% per year in the period 1870-1913 in West-
ern Europe, the population growth rate decreased to an average of 0.42% per 
year in the years 1913-1950, while it continued to grow in other parts of the 
world. At the same time, the world average growth rate of GDP per capita kept 
on increasing, reaching an average of 2.92% per year on the period 1950-1973. 
Figure 3: Growth of GDP per Capita and Population, 1500-2000 
 
Source: From Galor using Maddison’s data5 (2004). 
 
Figure 3 illustrates the evolution of the relationship between output and popula-
tion growth over the course of history in Western Europe, characterized by 
three distinct eras: the stagnation, the take-off and the sustained growth. 
                                                             
5  Maddison (2001). 
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3. Main Challenges 
The development process described in section 2 raises number of questioning 
and puzzles. This exacerbates the interest of researchers specialized in the field 
of growth and development. Unprecedented upheavals occurred during this 
process. The demographic transition, the transition from stagnation to growth 
and the phenomenon of great divergence in income per capita took place with 
different timings across regions of the world. Many mysteries persist. Contem-
porary growth theorists such as economic historians need to improve the under-
standing of the development process: the driving forces and underlying deter-
minants that led to the escape from the Malthusian trap and allowed the 
transition to sustained growth. The main questions to answer are the following 
one:  
- What can explain the centuries of stagnation that characterized most of 
human history? 
- What are the driving forces that account for the sudden increase in 
growth rates of GDP per capita and the persistent stagnation in others?  
- What conducted to the Industrial Revolution? What did this phenomenon 
occur first in Great Britain?  
- What factors can account for the relationship between population and 
output growth? Why has the positive link between income and population 
growth reversed its course in some economies but not in others? 
- What are the main forces that initiated the process of demographic transi-
tion? 
- What has caused the Great Divergence in income per capita across re-
gions of the world over the last two centuries? 
- Would the transition have been possible without the demographic transi-
tion?  
In other words, what are the underlying behavioral and technological structures 
that could simultaneously account for these distinct phases of development? 
Additionally, what are their implications for the contemporary growth process 
of developed and under-developed countries? 
The fundamental challenge faced by social scientists is to provide credible 
answers to the questioning before-mentioned using the contributions both of 
economists, historians and even sociologists. The issue for growth theorists is 
to develop a unified theory of growth that would account for the main features 
of the three distinct phases that have characterized the process of development: 
the Malthusian era, the period of transition and the modern growth regime.  
This is what has been first undertaken by Galor and Weil (1999, 2000) with 
the development of the Unified Growth Theory. In other words, the theory aims 
to give a better understanding of the driving forces that have conducted to 
escape the Malthusian trap and allow a transition to a state of sustained growth. 
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4. Toward a Unified Growth Theory 
Background – Malthusian Theory 
World economic history has then been dominated by the Malthusian stagna-
tion. The Classical growth theory developed by Malthus in 1798 in An Essay 
on Principle of Population matches pretty well with the empirical evidences of 
the relation between income and population dynamics prior to the Industrial 
Revolution. According to this theory, the effect of population growth would be 
counterbalanced by the expansion of resources, reflecting in such a way the 
fluctuations of the income per capita around a subsistence level. In other words, 
without changes in the level of technology (resources) the population size 
would remain stable as well as the income per capita, while periods of techno-
logical progress (expansion of resources) would lead to an increase in popula-
tion growth, triggering ultimately a decline in income per capita.  
Despite the capacity of the Malthusian theory to capture the characteristics 
of the epoch of stagnation, its predictions appear inconsistent with the features 
of the post-demographic transition era as well as that of the modern growth 
regime. 
Theories of Demographic Transition 
From a theoretical point of view different factors could have triggered a demo-
graphic transition, i.e. a period of significant reduction in fertility rates and 
population growth following the unprecedented increase in population growth.  
Theorists have examined a set of plausible explanations being at the root of 
the demographic transition and the reversal in the relation between income and 
population growth. Among these potential factors, we came across the decline 
in child mortality rates leading to a corresponding decrease in total fertility 
rates. Some researchers (Becker, 1981) argued also that the rise in per capita 
income had an effect on both the household’s income and the opportunity cost 
of raising children. In both cases, historical (and empirical) evidences contra-
dict these potentialities. First, in Western countries the decline in mortality 
started a century before the decline in fertility. Secondly, the demographic 
transition occurred simultaneously across countries that significantly differ in 
their income per capita. 
The gradual rise in the demand for human capital along the process of indu-
strialization has been seen by some researchers as a prime force leading to the 
onset of the demographic transition, specifically during the second phase of the 
Industrial Revolution. Galor and Weil (1999, 2000) developed the idea that the 
acceleration in the rate of technological progress would gradually increase the 
demand for human capital, inducing parents to invest in the quality of their 
offspring rather than in the quantity. The existence of a negative correlation 
between education and fertility has been demonstrated by Becker, Cinnirella 
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and Woessmann (2011) with new county-level evidence for Prussia in 1816. 
Ultimately, the process of human capital accumulation would induce a reduc-
tion in fertility rates as far as the growth rate of technological progress increase. 
The decline in the gender gap is another argument advanced as a reinforcing 
mechanism impacting fertility rates. According to Galor and Weil (1996), 
technological progress and capital accumulation would positively impact the 
relative wages of women along the process of industrialization which would 
increase the opportunity cost of raising children, and ultimately lead to a reduc-
tion in fertility. 
The Unified Growth Theory 
The inability of exogenous and endogenous growth models to explain the proc-
ess of development over the full span of human history motivated growth theo-
rists to develop a unified theory of growth, i.e. a theory that would capture in a 
single analytical framework the main characteristics of the process of develop-
ment.  
The Unified Growth Theory integrates the main features of the Malthusian 
economy but within a context where the size of population and technology are 
linked. First, the increase in technological progress and the capital accumula-
tion counterbalances the negative effect of population growth on income per 
capita highlighted by the Malthusian theory. As proposed by Galor and Weil 
(2000): 
[…] during the Malthusian epoch, the dynamical system would have to be 
characterized by a stable Malthusian steady-state equilibrium, but ultimately 
due to the evolution of latent state variables in this epoch, the Malthusian 
steady-state equilibrium would vanish endogenously leaving the arena to the 
gravitational forces of the emerging Modern Growth Regime. 
Henceforth, the theory generates the endogenous driving forces allowing the 
economy to experience a demographic transition and which ultimately lead to a 
take-off from the era of stagnation towards a state of sustained economic 
growth.  
5. Conclusion 
The unified theory of growth is developed as an alternative theory of exoge-
nous and endogenous model that could capture in a single framework the main 
characteristics of the process of development. The Unified Growth Theory shed 
lights on the driving forces that would enable countries in a state of Malthusian 
stagnation to take-off towards a state of sustained economic growth.  
In the Malthusian Regime, the economy remains trapped around a substan-
tial level of output growth. During the Post-Malthusian Regime, the pace of 
technological progress accelerates, caused by the increase in the size of popula-
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tion, and allows the economy to generate a take-off. In the Modern Growth 
Regime, the output per capita increases along with the rate of population 
growth and human-capital accumulation (Galor and Weil, 2000). Rapid tech-
nological progress, resulting from human capital accumulation, triggers a de-
mographic transition with a constant decrease in fertility rates (Galor, 2011).  
Other central determinants of the development process have been left out 
from the first attempts of modeling a unified theory of growth. This left the 
door open to social scientists and growth theorists to bring the lights on a more 
complete understanding of the driving forces allowing the development process 
in different regions of the world over the last century. A greater challenge in 
the construction of a Unified Growth Theory is to get a better understanding of 
the past in order to comprehend the future. The path dependency could then be 
a guide in the analysis and the implementation of economic policies. 
Annexe 
The development process is a complex phenomenon. In order to have a better 
understanding of the full span of human economic history, we chose to imagine 
what would represent the time span of 4Ma BC-2010 AD in terms of a 24 
hours-day, in the inspiration of the Snowdown’s “soccer field of history” 
(Snowdown, 2008).  
If humans appeared at 0h00 and if 24 hours have elapsed… Humans are 
born 3 to 5 million of years ago (depending on whether we consider Australo-
pithecus as being Humans or only the type Homo) but let’s bring back this 
period to 24 hours. At the beginning, at 0h00, Humans evolved in an economy 
of predation, divided into groups of hunters-gatherers, fishers, pickers (using 
available natural resources without having the control over them). At approx-
imately 21 h 48 min 29 sec, on our one-day scale, the domestication of fire by 
Homo erectus marks a turning point in the Prehistory (around 450 000 BC). At 
about 23 h 56 min 04 sec, the Neolithic Revolution initiates the transition from 
hunting and gathering towards agriculture and sedentary lifestyle. The livelih-
ood of the population is insured by the production. Then everything accele-
rates, it was 23 h 58 min 54 sec 546 ms when the Industrial Revolution marked 
the transition from a predominantly agricultural and artisanal society towards a 
commercial and industrial society (lagged in time and space depending on the 
considered countries); at 23 h 58 min 56 sec 625 ms, onset of the Demographic 
Transition with a multiplication by two or three of the European population. 
Figure 4a illustrates the time span of human history in 24 hours. Figure 4b 
shows that during the last hour of the day of history (10,000 BC-2010 AD), the 
Malthusian Growth Regime dominated human history until the onset of the 
Industrial Revolution. Figure 4c represents the final 01 min 05 sec 454 ms that 
has witnessed the demographic transition and the emergence of the modern 
growth regime. 
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Figure 4: a-c 
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